Core Issue, a look at epistemology, science, math, and power
Notes written in 2002
Douglass Carmichael
We have reached a point where the combination of official
knowledge and public institutions is every bit as oppressive
in 2000 as the medieval and Aristotelian synthesis of 1500.
In 1600 Francis Bacon tried to break out of the grip
of conventionalized concepts by putting unusual stress
on the observation of individual facts. However individual
facts that are good at raising questions could not lead to theories
without some intervening mental scheme. And
the question was, where did they come from? Newton set
a model of using mathematics to derive what numbers aught
to do. From then on the conceptual system came before observation.
While there were squabbles about this, such as David
Hume's raising the issue of the impossibility of induction
from facts to theories, the procedure was To develop concepts
that could fit facts. But of course the facts were selected
to fit the theories. We did not look at green frogs in
order to understand stars. Preconceptions guided the choice
of observations. From the beginning this model was tied
in to social policy and governance. The individual cases
were not interesting but cases that supported generalizations
were. Instead of a search for truth there was a search
for manageability. if there was one of one kind of person
and ten of another that and where the basis for concepts
and one was avoided. This is the very opposite of the method
proposed by bacon.
The mystery of mathematics Is a major part of the problem.
Mathematics is fascinating and that it can be a description
of some parts of reality is a deep and abiding problem .
But the jump from surveying and architecture to the idea
that mathematics describes everything -- a step taken by
Plato -- has had severe consequences, such as imaginative classical
painting of the renaissance where fascinating characters
are acting out their dramas surrounded by extraordinary
rational architecture . What science has done is to keep
the architecture and to avoid the drama and to call the
resulting picture, stripped of humans, the theory of the
real world .
My own theory, based on the work of people like Helmholtz
and Piaget, is that mathematics is deeply related to the
motion of the body in space, and not just the human body. The ability of a dog to seemingly calculate the parabola of
a thrown ball makes a very deep impression. Piaget's view
is that a sounded symbol is attached to these actions of the bbody, muscles and bones in spce and their controlling nerves, and through internalized images and speech tie together
the internal representations of the movement of the body
and a group of these become the basis for mathematics and it's transformations.
The problem is that the body has many more parts than just
movement in space. There is the entire emotional life inherited
from our mammalian ancestors, and just as mathematics represents
the movement of the body in space, poetry and the arts represent
the movement of the body in relationships. Reducing architecture
to drama is as ridiculous as reducing drama to architecture.
Either way is taking a part for the whole, and such selection
is motivated by human ambition and perceived opportunities.
The need to count land , crops, and soldiers for Successful
governance created a style, in anticipation, that numbers
were the stuff of governance, while the inner life of the
persons being counted did not count. Ten soldiers were
ten soldiers. It did not matter if some were in love and
some were not, some were parents and some are not, that several
might be artists and several might have farms that needed
attention. Ten soldiers were necessary to fight the war. England lost most of its younger artists in WW1, and the United States, much of its culture in the Civil War.
The mathematics and the machine are deeply entwined. The
preferences in what has been called science is to prefer
the mathematical and the mechanical to the dramatic. This
history is very complex and recent works such as Mirowski's
book Machine Dreams: how economics became a cyborg science,
and Mary Poovey's The History of the Modern Fact, subtitled
problems of knowledge in the sciences of wealth and society
, provide an extraordinary grounding for seeing how mathematics,
commerce, war, and bureaucracy form a tight fabric every
bit as oppressive and conventional as the stalled occasion
they resulted from the medieval synthesis.
The modern
Achievement, built on the medieval, were the result of highly
creative acts at a moment in a highly creative culture ,
but institutions and mental habits
got in the way of fresh observation and critical thinking.
In both cases the ideology supported power rather than
individual conscience or the quality of life for the community. The promise
of science offended power through new knowledge and those we call
scientists for the last few hundred years have narrowed the scope of questions.
The numbers folks , while claiming to be aligned with science,
are deeply unscientific. The brutal issues of population
increase , the spreading misery among the increasingly large
number of people who are marginalized , and the collapse
of much of the environment do not have a systemic effect because
the scientists and the managers are living in enclaves . If
they would allow more openness to their own experience nand live close to others and daily lives, broader theories cold be made to work and to feel the clean air of fresh thinking
and direct observation .
If we go back into the eighteenth century and even much
of the nineteenth we see that most people lived in a world
that was different from that of commerce and money . A biography
such as Fraser's on Charlotte BrThe onte shows a conscious
world of religious concerns that permeated every moment
of daily life as much as market forces consciously do today.
Of course commerce has always been an important. Just as
mathematics could describe it important aspects of life.
But there were other aspects , and that is the point. and
I will not let pass the opportunity to suggest that science
as it is practiced , and the resulting worldview of technology
and reductionism is an absolutely as much a religion with
its rituals and it's priests as the church never was .
Cigarette smoking is so addictive because it weaves together
the hand, the eye, the nose, the mouth, the lips, and the
social gesture, the smell of smoke, the flow of light through
the rising column and integrated into the biochemistry of
the nervous system. The market, money, technology, status
, and welfare are also of a complex interweaving and I think
the two bear some similarity as models of compulsive and
rewarding addictions.
Money, as part of quantification, tends to give the illusion
that things are equal that are in fact not equal. 12,000
oranges=one horse , a fifth of a car , a tenth of Some people's
annual salary the luges and is of a manageable equivalencees.While
the trick can be done, the cost is very high. When a person
is very anxious they tend towards compulsive activity. The
strategy is to deal with something small that can be mastered
while denying the existence of the large forces that threaten
the personality . . Money of course works, but to the extent
that it moves into the foreground and real differences are
lost it is a symptom and a strategy of the nation's that,
because it closes off enquiry, is neither scientific more
pragmatic and is not a suitable basis for long-term effective
governance .
Elites want a system that pays off for them and they will
use with partial understandings anything they can get hold
of . It is not surprising because each person does this
in their own personal life . But this doesn't preclude the
possibility of keen observation, critical thinking, and
creative design . But currently we are so trapped in our
mainstream thinking with its castles and of unreality that
there is no research program, no institution, and almost
no person who stands outside flow .
The situation is fascinating and full of opportunity to
to the strategy that began modern science , that of going
outside and looking to see what is there, and working our
thought from what we find rather than only looking to find
what we thought.
The background: my own path is somewhat idiosyncratic
it starts in my experience of New York City growing up as
a child going to a good school and living in poverty. This
took me to physics as a safe place and while it Caltech
I found relief in the Hallett Smith's course on Yates, Thomas
Mann , Joyce, And Eliott. I also took a course from Alfred
Stern on the to me obscure philosophers Ernest Cassirer, Hans Vahinger , and the Spaniard Unamuno. In graduate
school at UC Berekeley I was first affected by the developmental school of Heinz Werner . But soon took up with the developmental
work of Piaget which rooted epistemology in organic development. That exploration was supported by Cassirer's philosophy
and symbolic forms . I moved further into the human and
social side through Kenneth Burke's application of the understanding
of drama to human life.
Secondarily I was supported by the work of Lewis Mumford, Eric Voegelin, Arthur Lovejoy, and personal contact with Paul Feyerbend . When I went to Harvard at the Center
for Cognitive Studies with Jerome Bruner I also meant Erik
Erikson and David Riesman who were in many ways the first
real men on the social science side in my life . I was very influenced
by Jerry Letvin and his mix of drama and biology . Feyerbend
introduced me to Giorgio deSanillana (not the philosopher
but the historian of early science) and I met Michael Maccoby, which led me to study psychoanalysis At Eric Fromm 's
institute in Mexico, and taught me social character analysis
Since then and there have been new influences. Increased
interest in Eric Voegelin , Mircea Eliade, Simon Schama, Mirowski,
MaryPoovey, and Henrik Ibsen, to name a few . I
do believe in cross fertilization , and, however much of
a burden it is, it also creates freedom and responsibility
.
Comments (0)
You don't have permission to comment on this page.